Private Military and Security Companies (PMSCs) have been operating for a while now. They provide assistance to countries or groups through private militaries and intelligence to carry out proxy work, transport and arrange weaponry, control unrest, protect resources, and aid political objectives in a globalised world. Although their work appears to smooth out obstacles and simplify operations, their status as non-state actors carrying out a function traditionally reserved for the state organ — the military — poses serious questions. Every nation is bound to protect its citizens through a stable military and to define its own defence. Privatising an institution so crucial to the state brings complex issues, such as company rivalries, unmonitored back-door operations, and an escape from accountability, which risks escalating unrest and further conflict. It is essential to examine the key areas where PMSCs have deeply established their influence, and equally important to determine ways to hold them accountable on international and humanitarian grounds.
On the Battlefield
As resentment has grown toward direct interventions by foreign armies in troubled nations — particularly over concerns regarding national integrity and autonomy — governments have increasingly employed covert, privatised supply chains in Syria, Yemen, Ukraine, and elsewhere to combat local militias and unrest in recent years. One such security agency, Regulus Global, founded by Will Somerindyke, expanded to over 15 employees and generated a revenue of approximately $40 million in 2016. Its reputation has been built strongly upon its ability to source and move weapons to difficult locations at great speed. What stands out alongside these growth statistics is Somerindyke’s core philosophy, specifically his assertion that:
“War is economics.”
This statement invites broader reflection on economics. The foundational principle articulated by Adam Smith was a free market with minimal government intervention. While the military is indeed being privatised, free markets also rely on competition and profit-maximisation. Could rival security firms begin competing with one another, deliberately hampering an opponent’s tasks to undermine their reputation? This is a critical distinction: state militaries are accountable to their respective states and international humanitarian frameworks, whereas PMSC employees are answerable entirely to their employer, regardless of their national backgrounds. They lack a consistent allegiance to a broader national cause. If profit-making becomes the sole objective, will such employees be willing to act against state interests? How much personal accountability will they accept? There is an urgent need to understand the larger dynamics under which privatised armies operate, where decisions can easily be swayed for commercial benefit.
PMSCs have also expanded their operations to assist foreign clients beyond their countries of origin. Saudi Arabia, for instance, relies heavily on US-based PMSCs for military and intelligence operations, personnel training, and internal security.
This dynamic raises questions of quasi-imperialism. Relying on outsourced intelligence and military services becomes precarious when a client state enters a conflict. Even if a private corporation asserts that its decisions are free of bias, what guarantee exists that its allegiances will not be compromised? Furthermore, what ensures that confidential data is not leaked or that security protocols are not compromised? Sovereign nations cannot be considered truly sovereign if their survival depends on external corporate actors. PMSCs represent another facet of indirect colonialism — one that must be viewed with deep scepticism.
Resource Protection
There are compelling arguments for protecting mines and valuable natural resources from constant plundering and insurgent activity; in these contexts, PMSCs aim to secure resources for better regulation. Erik Prince, the founder of Blackwater (and later Vectus Global), states that his work involves facilitating business in ‘difficult places’ by establishing a secure environment for resource extraction. In the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), Prince secured a tax collection contract from the government aimed at combating mining revenue theft by armed groups. He notes that these operations target M23, a rebel group that diverts substantial mining revenue from the DRC to Rwanda. This proliferation of funds has enabled access to Chinese surface-to-air missiles, armed Turkish drones, Israeli laser-guided missiles, and other lethal weaponry.
In Haiti, his firm has similarly been active in attempting to curb gang violence. However, these interventions often reflect a ‘white saviour’ complex, wherein Western actors assume a duty to rescue regions from chaos because their organizational frameworks are viewed as superior. Equally, these operations serve to secure control over resource-rich lands and gain direct access to wealth. Greed and paternalism appear to operate simultaneously beneath the guise of security and protection.
Logistics and Technology
These firms are also incorporating advanced technology to increase operational speed and accuracy. Prince claims that affordable, high-precision drones represent the next major shift in warfare. In conflicts such as Ukraine, where field commanders acquire equipment online, logistics and technology are intertwining to deliver rapid ground support. PMSCs act as the central link enabling this integration.
Political Implications
A publication titled New Publication Examines the Effects of Private Military and Security Companies, published on the Geneva Academy website, offers crucial insights into the risks of outsourcing military services. Erica Harper, Head of Research and Policy Studies at the Geneva Academy, highlights that these firms lower the barrier to entering conflicts:
“Part of the attractiveness of PMSCs is that they can break rules that States can’t or shouldn’t. A rule free zone that is beyond the reach of international accountability interrupts the system’s ability to uphold peace and security.”
In effect, states gain a convenient mechanism to engage in conflict without directly undertaking controversial actions themselves.
Notably, many major private security firms have declined to sign international regulatory frameworks, such as the Montreux Document. In an era characterised by heightened geopolitical tensions — particularly between major global powers — operating through private proxies offers a convenient strategy. Yet, non-transparent decisions that carry direct consequences for civilian populations require oversight under international humanitarian frameworks. Unfortunately, many PMSC operations are so complex and fragmented that the public cannot easily understand or hold these non-state actors accountable. As writer James Cockayne observes:
“There is now a network of military entrepreneurs operating around the world, recruiting in one country, headquartered in a second, contracted to a third, perhaps operating weapons in a fourth to carry out attacks in a fifth.”