The state in Washington is such that across the world, people wake up bracing for the next shock to come from the White House and its many subordinate departments. A very serious proposal to displace the Palestinian people from Gaza, the dismantling of the US Department of Education as a whole, the near severing of American trade ties with its neighboring states—every bit of news coming from the capital of the world’s hegemon leaves observers reeling.
This week’s piece has similarly sent intelligence establishments the world over spiraling, scratching their heads, and screaming: “How could they do this?”
But first, some background.
In his seminal text The Art of War, Chinese general and philosopher Sun Tzu writes:
“If you know the enemy and know yourself, you need not fear the result of a hundred battles.”
That quote holds just as true today as it did when first written in the fifth century BCE. It explains why governments across the world place so much importance on the security and integrity of sensitive communications. After all, the breaking of the German Enigma Code in World War II shortened the war and gave Britain vital intelligence needed to preempt German air attacks. On the other side of the world, code talkers in the Pacific theatre ensured that American messages could not be intercepted by speaking in codes developed from Native American languages.
While information about how governments communicate internally is not widely available, it is understood that the US government is especially careful about its classified data. While there are occasional leaks, the United States—especially the Department of Defense—places great emphasis on cybersecurity, going as far as to create three different networks with varying levels of protection. The most secure of these, the Joint Worldwide Intelligence Communications System, can’t even be accessed outside of purpose-built safe rooms called SCIFs (Sensitive Compartmented Information Facilities).
What happened this week?
While the use of closed networks and secure devices has been a cornerstone of communications in the US defense and intelligence establishments, an exposé from The Atlantic cast serious doubts on the practices being followed by their upper echelons presently.
The Vice President of the United States, along with an A-list of government officials—including the Secretary of Defense, the National Security Advisor to President Trump, and the Director of the CIA—were found to be in a group chat on the messaging app Signal. Signal, while known to be one of the more secure platforms available to the general public—a favorite among dissidents and anti-state elements wishing to evade surveillance—relies on the open internet for transmitting messages, making them susceptible to interception.
While this was bad enough, it would have gone unnoticed for some time longer were it not for a member of the chat accidentally adding the Editor-in-Chief of The Atlantic, Jeffrey Goldberg, to the conversation. Mr. Goldberg published the initial report, warning that classified information was being discussed on insecure platforms. This was met with a mixture of denial and rebuttal. President Trump questioned the credibility of the journalist, while members of the group chat insisted that the information discussed was not classified. A follow-up report from Mr. Goldberg published screenshots showing the true extent of what was being talked about.
The chat, while discussing US military action in Yemen, had minute-by-minute updates on American strikes targeting the Houthis. The results of these strikes were discussed, as were intelligence assessments of the situation and how the actions of foreign powers in the theatre—Israel—would impact American policies. The screenshots also show that the messages were set to be deleted four weeks after they were sent, which is problematic considering that official communications are to be recorded for future reference in the United States.
What does this mean?
Domestically, this will probably raise a few eyebrows among those working with the US defense and intelligence establishment—a retired military judge even went so far as to say that this was a court-martial offense. The US Congress has already started to ask questions, and so far, the questions seem to be coming in from both sides of the aisle. However, if this is allowed to go through without some form of reprimand, it could encourage others to disregard the best practices employed by the Department of Defense, which could inflict long-lasting damage.
Internationally, government agencies—especially intelligence agencies allied with the United States—are likely concerned about how the data they share with the Americans is kept safe. Built on trust, the intelligence trade is surprisingly open between allies, as evidenced by the documents pertaining to the investigation of the assassination of President John F. Kennedy, which were declassified recently. This declassification was itself received poorly by some of the foreign intelligence agencies involved. Aside from state actors, the United States also relies on a great many individual actors to facilitate its military and intelligence activities overseas. Any major leak might endanger these assets and make people less willing to work with the Americans.
This is a developing story, but it shows a glimpse of the damage caused by the appointment of political loyalists instead of seasoned experts to critical positions.