The Gilgit-Baltistan Assembly passed the Land Reform Bill in May 2025 with a majority vote, which is contentious and straightforward for indigenous people and the government, respectively. This bill is regarded as a historic reform by the lawyer community following the earlier land regulations that operated under systems like Khalisa-e-Sarkar (state land) and Nautore (allotment of barren land), which were partially reformed in the late 1970s but trace their origins to the pre-independence era. Similarly, during the PMLN and PTI regimes in 2016 and 2022, land reform bills were proposed in the assembly but were turned down. While this bill has sparked extensive debates as well as protests from local people, leading to the detention of local activists, an in-depth analysis remains crucial. From a lens of legal and customary perspectives, the bill contains significant loopholes, and it should be timely addressed due to its pessimistic and chronic impact on land ownership and governance in Gilgit-Baltistan.
According to the land reform bill 2025, all unappropriated lands, including pastures, mountains, rivers, nullahs, etc., are declared as common lands in settled and unsettled districts. It acknowledges the public as the common owners of this land. Contrary to Khalisa-e-Sarkar and Nautore rules, there was no such concept of common land; rather, the government had the ultimate ownership to bestow that land to any individual. Thus, the oppressive and unjust law from the colonial era has been abolished. In addition, common land is further described as common impartible land and common partible land. Common Impartible land means land which cannot be allotted to any individual, while common partible lands include pastures or nullahs situated within the territorial boundaries of the village according to customary laws and the undeveloped lands which are not owned by the government.
Furthermore, the government shall frame the Gilgit-Baltistan Land Apportionment Board (GBLAB). It issues policy direction to the district land apportionment board for the allocation of partible land among the Haqdaran-e-Arazee of the respective Haqdar Mouza. It can review, refer for amendment or reject the apportionment plan submitted by the district land apportionment board. GBLAB members include the Chief Minister of GB, who serves as the chairman; assembly members nominated by the speaker; the Secretary of the Planning and Development Department of GB; and several other key members. Simultaneously, there shall be a district land apportionment board and a draft partition plan of partible land in the subordination of GBLAB. It is composed of the deputy commissioner as the chairman, the assistant commissioner, and several other distinguished members. Furthermore, there is a village verification committee where the Tehsildar acts as the secretary, Lumardars/Numbaradars of the Village, with a few other notables.
A vigilant examination of the land reform bill reveals striking drawbacks that jeopardise the sovereignty of the indigenous land of Gilgit Baltistan. Initially, one primary drawback of the bill appears in Chapter 3, Section 4, where the composition of DLAB is heavily tilted in favour of bureaucracy. This structure grants overwhelming supremacy to unelected officials, which is irreconcilable with the principles of democracy. Secondly, the bill includes a clause stating that the “elected head(s) of local government, if applicable, can be members of the District Apportionment Board.” This provision seems deceitful, as there are no local government representatives. Using such a phrase undermines both the ethos and effectiveness of the reform. Simultaneously, the structure of the village verification committee again depicts the authorisation of bureaucracy in leading positions. Likewise, Chapter IX’s provision recognises the significance of customary laws and alternative dispute resolution (ADR). It blends administrative duties with community-based conflict resolution. The core issue lies in assigning collectors the responsibility of facilitating boundary disputes.
Additionally, Chapter 2, IV(e) and Chapter X, 21 led to serious concerns due to their ambiguity. This provision mandates the Haqdaran-e-Arazee to reserve 10% of the partible land or any other portion for public purposes or ecological sensitivity. The undefined scope of public purpose opens rooms for multifaceted interpretation. Analogously, the term “any other part” lacks transparency, leaving landowners ambivalent about which parts of their land could be subject to such designation.
In the light of the above-identified loopholes, it is recommended that a more democratic and effective approach would have been to first conduct the long-overdue local government elections in Gilgit Baltistan, the last of which were conducted over two decades ago (around 1992). A more democratic approach would be to incorporate the local government representatives in the district apportionment board and village verification committee.
Along with that, the public purpose should be clearly defined. Does ‘public purpose’ mean building educational institutions, hospitals, or other public facilities? Such ambiguity creates a risk of illegitimate use of power by authorities to justify land acquisition for purposes that are in juxtaposition to public interest, such as mining, so-called green tourism, or other ventures driven by geopolitical motives. Similarly, the phrase “the other part” used in the bill should also be clearly defined. Specifically, it needs to clarify which part of the partible land can be classified as impartible land. Without this clear distinction, there is a risk of perplexity and inconsistent interpretation regarding land classification.
Furthermore, in Chapter IX: General Provisions, the Boundary disputes and questions of traditional land rights are deeply rooted in local custom, and their resolution demands local legitimacy, not top-down bureaucratic control. These disputes are best handled by elected local government bodies and village elders familiar with customary norms. Allowing the DC to interfere in these matters sabotages local autonomy and the essence of customary dispute resolution, which the bill itself claims to respect. Legally, the Collector’s responsibility is of an administrative nature, focusing more on maintaining land records, revenue collection, and implementing land policies, not on acting as a mediating actor of boundary disputes or determining customary ownership.
In a nutshell, it is indispensable that the government should conduct the long-overdue election of local government in Gilgit Baltistan. Without local government representative implementation, this provision becomes even more troublesome because it will fortify the hold of bureaucracy instead of empowering communities. At the same time, clear definitions are essential to ensure transparency, protect landowners’ rights, and prevent arbitrary decisions.