Françafrique: By the 1960s, France had left Africa. However, the absence was more overwhelming than the presence because it stayed behind in the currency, the military bases, the uranium mines, and the mirror. Colonial amnesia has since persisted intentionally, hidden beneath the illusion of Françafrique. Initially, the term ‘Françafrique’ was used as a pun on ‘France-Afrique’ and ‘France-à-fric’, which translates to ‘France for cash’. It originated in 1950s but gained critical force by 1998 through the exposé by François‑Xavier Verschave, who described it as a network of economic extraction, political manipulation, and military entrenchment even long after formal independence. It presents a paradox that begins with a proclamation of the end of Paris’ neo-colonial era and culminates in Francophone Africa, revealing a contrasting reality centred on the CFA franc and French corporate control of resources.
It has not merely been a matter of policy but of time, because this enduring structure is rooted in colonial amnesia. It implies a reluctance in Paris to acknowledge the partial achievement of independence, akin to a silent former coloniser who refuses to exit the party. In reality, Paris loves to wax lyrical about partnership, but to many in Mali, Niger, and Burkina Faso, it appears more like a Zoroastrian flame that cannot be extinguished. President Macron’s lecture on gratitude to Africans was akin to handing them a bill. And the reaction? It was as predictable as it was damning: jail the past, exile the reminders and look elsewhere. To the African audience, it sounded like a colonial echo of merci, colonisé.
Africa Rewrites the Final Chapter of Françafrique
In Mali, the domino finally flipped. Its opening act in the post-francophone theatre was dramatic. In 2013, Mali’s insurgency prompted Operation Serval, which was sold as heroism. A decade later, Barkhane arrived with its 5,000 troops, but it became more of a Greek tragedy. Thus, initially welcomed, these missions increasingly came to be seen as military occupation under a humanitarian umbrella.
By 2020, protests had grown over civilian deaths and failures to secure the North. So the junta bid farewell to the French ambassadors and invited Russia’s Wagner Group for a meeting, which continued for some time. In essence, it was never about choosing Russia but rather, it was about rejecting France. Among many Malians, the phrase “better the devil you know” became: “Better the Russian we choose”.
Enter Ibrahim Traoré, Burkina’s prodigal son of Pan-Africanism with a cultish appeal and state-driven revolution. In many ways, Traoré turned off the CFA tap, shoved French military presence out, nationalised gold mines and invited new partners to the table. This represented a sankarist pivot that was characterised by significant changes. His domestic agenda aligns with Sankara’s, focusing on land reforms, agricultural self-sufficiency, domestic industry, and women’s emancipation, all of which are believed to boost GDP growth. However, Traore’s Revolution Progressiste et Populaire remains inconsistent with burgeoning human rights concerns regarding instability and displacement.
This effectively shifts the discussion to Niger, where uranium glitters in the soil beneath a frustrated population. Protest movements like M62 demanded greater autonomy when they witnessed French miners syphoning national wealth. Respectively, Niger also embraced Russia, with African Corps instructors arriving to replace departing French trainers, and pivoted towards Chinese energy agreements. The shock value was great, as Niger no longer appeared as a French footnote.
This was not geopolitics by default but a deeply conscious ideological pivot echoing narratives of emancipation galvanised by leaders who are more aligned with national pride than Western patronage.
What analysts derisively termed the “Coup Belt” is better understood as a collective political metamorphosis that reflects a rejection of imposed democracy and economic models tied to France. The label, however, is a ragtag quilt of instability. On the other hand, many citizens see it as a canvas for a deliberate repainting of post-colonial governance.
This comes forth as a statewide declaration of refusing to be puppets or Quid pro quo partners. They have expelled French soldiers, dismantled French-based currency zones and embraced rather multipolar allegiances. The Afrobarometer polls also reveal a deeper discovery that shows a decline in trust for liberal Western democracies. But there is also a spike in yearning; it relates to ‘strongmen who deliver’. The fractures across Mali, Burkina, and Niger share six commonalities: expulsion of French forces, rupture from French media and currency, nationalisation of resources, the embrace of Russian, Chinese, and Turkish alternatives, formation of the Alliance of Sahel States (AES), and a narrative of post-colonial sovereignty.
In this context, countries like Russia and China are perceived not only as allies but also as embodiments of certain ideologies. In Russia’s case, it sells itself as the antidote to moralised paternalism. Under the guise of military professionalism, Russia asserts that it is defending its sovereignty and its own interests. In another fashion, China continues to underpin its fairly continental role of ‘no-strings infrastructure’. No sermons, no roads or refineries, a simple $400 oil pipeline in Niger and a dairy factory in Burkina, built, financed and handed over. China’s philosophy in the Sahel: Development sans demagoguery.
The question arises whether France is battling an existential identity crisis. The answer is that Paris panics over troop withdrawals and geopolitical losses but misses the irony. In reality, the breakdown is ideological because France pictures Africa as orbiting it. Macron’s brand of paternalism and how they should thank us appears more desperate than usual. They appear determined to conform to the narrative, regardless of whether the role aligns with their own interests.
The solution, in political vernacular, is to ‘rewrite the playbook’. If France truly desires post-imperial relevance, then it needs to own the ledger through accountability, reparations and apologies. More betterment would come through the acceptance of plural partnerships and letting go of the CFA leash by backing new regional currency experiments. What’s playing out in Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger is not merely amateur dramatics. It can be seen more as a sequel or a counter-narrative of an old colonial screenplay. Paris may count the loss of a base in Mali or a mine in Niger, but Africa is counting its regained dignity.